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ABSTRACT
Architecture-based threat modeling of Autonomous Vehicle software helps to identify the poten-
tial threats to the given vehicle it is employed to. However, software are often developed iteratively,
in frequent increments, which makes maintaining their architecture representations challenging.
Thus, the threat model of a given software, developed from the architecture diagrams can be-
come quickly obsolete. This creative component proposes the recovery of software architecture
from source code of software and the use of an attack surface-specific threat library to identify the
threats that apply to a given version of the software. The approach is applied to an autonomous
vehicle software called Apollo Auto, which is developed by Baidu. We show how to automatically
recover the architecture of the software and identify the threats that apply to it. The results of
this project indicate the differences between the threat models of the same software, developed
from the given architecture, ground-truth architecture and recovered architecture of the software.
Furthermore it shows that threat model developed from given obsolete architecture may miss some
impact threats that apply to the software.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Threat modeling involves understanding the complexity of the system and identifying all possible
threats to the system, regardless of whether or not they can be exploited. Identifying threats helps
develop realistic and meaningful security requirements and plan security tests. Proper identification
of threats and appropriate selection of countermeasures reduces the ability of attackers to misuse
the system. In that respect, threat modeling looks at the system from an adversary’s perspective to
help designers anticipate attack goals and determine answers to questions about what the system
is designed to protect, and from whom[5].
Threat modeling process consists of characterizing the system, identifying assets and access
points, and identifying the applicable threats[5][6]. Characterizing the system involves understand-
ing the system components and their interconnections, and creating a system model emphasizing its
main characteristics that is, describing the architecture of the system. Identifying Assets and access
points involve applying techniques to recover the system. Identifying threats involves identifying
the threat profile of a system and the potential attacks that need to be addressed.
The architecture of the software is the main input to the threat modelling process but software
architectures are influenced by the background and the experiences of the architect[7]. Software
architecture, in general, is a perception of the structure of components of a program or a system,
their interrelationships and their guidelines governing their design and evolution over time. Thus,
assume a case where there are two security experts, a defender and an attacker are given the same
software: one to defend and other to attack it. Since the architecture of the software is largely
drawn from the understanding of the software components and design, the two experts may have
two different architectures and therefore two sets of potential threats that they could evaluate[7].
21.1 Problem
The autonomous vehicle software considered for our research is Apollo Auto. Apollo Auto
is an open-source widely used autonomous vehicle software, with over 300 contributors. It mirrors
the generic architecture of an autonomous vehicle[8].
Threat modeling for autonomous vehicle systems is complicated because the system is com-
posed of multiple ECUs communicating through in-vehicle network[9], the hardware and applica-
tions clubbed together, and the continuous evolution of these components. In addition, documented
architecture of the system becomes old quickly and may not represent the software. In addition,
there is difference in system architectures by different experts. The use of different architectures
in threat modelling prompts identification of different threats and hence different threat models.
Autonomous Vehicle are thus complicated systems and the two problems apply. The motivation
for this research project is to generate an automated threat model for autonomous vehicle and
investigate its efficacy.
This project addresses the following research question.
What is the relationship between semi-automated threat model and manual threat
model of an autonomous vehicle platform?
1.2 Approach
To address the research question, we used three architectures of Apollo Auto as inputs to the
threat modeling process: Given architecture, Ground-truth architecture and Recovered architec-
ture.
We used the threat library developed by Petit et. al[8] as template to identify the threats to
thr system. The Threat model for each of these architectures is generated and the similarities and
differences in the list of identified threats is reported and analyzed.
31.3 Contribution
The major contributions of this thesis are :
• Identification of threats that apply to the autonomous vehicle platform Apollo Auto based
on the three architectures : given architecture, ground-truth architecture and recovered ar-
chitecture.
• Analysis of the similarities and differences between the threat models.
1.4 Organization
This creative component is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 2 provides a background
concepts and tools used in the research. Chapter 3 discusses related work. Chapter 4 describes
Apollo Auto and its components. Chapter 5 depicts the process of Architecture Recovery and its
results. Chapter 6 details the approach to threat modelling over the three defined architectures.
Chapter 7 presents the differences and the similarities between the threat models that were applied
in Chapter 6. Finally Chapter 8 presents the conclusion.
4CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
This chapter provides background information on the following topics: Static code analy-
sis(Callgraphs), Prescriptive and Descriptive architecture, architecture recovery, tools used for
architecture recovery - LLVM framework and Bunch.
2.1 Static Program Analysis
Static program analysis is the analysis of computer software that is performed without actually
executing programs[10]. In most cases the analysis is performed on some version of the source code,
and in the other cases, some form of the object code[11]. Any technique performing analysis or
optimization across procedure boundaries requires some underlying representation of the program
structure. Most often the used structure is the call graph: a static representation of the dynamic
invocation relationships between procedures in a program[12]. A node in the call graph represents
a procedure(or function), and an edge (p to q) exists if procedure p can invoke procedure q. In a
callgraph each call site from p to q is represents by a distinct edge[13].
2.2 Prescriptive and Descriptive Architecture
A software system’s architecture is a set of principle design decisions made about the system.
During the process of engineering a software system, the architect make a set of architectural design
decisions that reflect their intent. In other words, these design decisions represent the prescription
for the system’s construction, together they form the prescriptive architecture of the system. The
prescriptive architecture is thus the system’s as-intended or as-conceived architecture[14]. The pre-
scriptive architecture does not exist in a tangible form; it could be entirely in the architects’ minds.
Alternatively, the prescriptive architecture could be captured in a sketch or forward representation
such as an architecture description language or another form of documentation.
5The prescriptive architecture isn’t the result of a phase in the process of developing a soft-
ware system, but captures the critical underpinning about the system from its inception through
retirement. Thus, at any point during this process, the architectural design decisions that are
part of the prescriptive architecture could be refined and realized with a set of artifacts. These
artifacts may include refinements of architectural design decisions in a notation such as the Unified
Modeling Language(UML) or their implementations in a programming language. The artifacts
may also include models of architectural styles and patterns used in the architecture, previously
existing off-the-shelf software components that will be used in the desired system, implementation
frameworks and middle-ware infrastructures that will aid the system’s construction, specifications
of standards to which the architecture needs to adhere[14].
While many of the artifacts of an architecture may have existed prior to and independently of
the architecture under consideration, each embodies certain design decisions that the architects find
desirable and relevant to the current system. The full set of principal design decisions, embodied
in the set of artifacts, is referred to as the system’s descriptive architecture. The descriptive
architecture is referred to as such because it describes how the system has been realized. The
descriptive architecture is thus the system’s as-realized architecture[14].
2.2.1 Architecture Recovery
Architectural recovery is the process of determining a software system’s architecture from its
implementation artifacts[14]. By its very nature, the process of architectural recovery extracts
a system’s descriptive architecture. That architecture, if complemented with a statement of the
architects’ original intent, can in principle be used to recover the system’s prescriptive architec-
ture. However, since the original architects may be unavailable, and their original intent may not
have been recorded (or have been violated over time), it is often impossible to recover a system’s
prescriptive architecture. Instead, the recovered descriptive architecture is treated as the closest
approximation of the system’s prescriptive architecture.
62.2.2 Ground-truth
In-order to evaluate the accuracy of our approach, we need to compare the recovered architec-
tures with ”ground-truth” use case architecture. A ”ground-truth” architecture is an architecture
that has been verified as accurate by the architects[15].
2.3 Tools Used for Architecture Recovery
This section discusses the tools used to recover the architecture of Autonomous vehicle software
Apollo Auto.
2.3.1 LLVM Framework
The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure[16] is a language and target-independent compiler system,
designed for both static and dynamic compilation.
The LLVM system has three main components:(1)the LLVM Virtual Instruction Set, a collec-
tion of reusable libraries for analysis, transformation and code generation; and (2)a set of tools built
from these libraries. The LLVM framework is characterized by a clean, simple, and modular design,
which allows new users to understand the representation, write new analyses, transformations, and
tools easily.
The LLVM Virtual Instruction Set is the common intermediate representation shared by all of
the LLVM subsystems. It is a simple, mid-level, three-address code representation that is designed
to be both language-independent and target-independent[17].
The instruction set provides explicit control-flow graphs, explicit dataflow information (in
SSA form), and a mid-level, language independent type system. The type system is rich enough to
support sophisticated, language-independent compiler techniques, including pointer analysis, de-
pendence analysis, and inter-procedural dataflow analyses, and transformations based on them[16].
The complete instruction set is described in detail in[18].
7The LLVM source base mostly consists of modular and reusable libraries. These components
include analyses and optimization, native code generators, JIT compiler support, profile-guided
feedback, etc. The LLVM system also includes several complete tools built from these compo-
nents, including an ANSI-conforming C/C++ compiler (which uses the GNU Compiler Collection
(GCC) parsers). The C/C++ compiler applies a large number of module-level (compile-time) and
cross-module (link-time) optimizations. Other LLVM tools include programs to manipulate the
Intermediary Representation (e.g. convert between ASCII and binary formats, extract functions
from a program, etc), a modular optimizer (which can run any LLVM optimization on an program,
driven from the command line), automated compiler debugging tools, and others. LLVM is an open
source project and can be downloaded from the github repository[19] or the downloads page from
the LLVM tutorials website[20].
2.3.2 Bunch Clustering Tool
The Bunch tool[21] is a clustering tool that partitions source-code modules into subsystems.
This task requires a well-defined representation of the systems modules and dependencies, along
with a set of algorithms that transform the original system representation into a hierarchy of
subsystems. It can be downloaded from the github repository[22] or from[23].
8CHAPTER 3. RELATED WORK
This chapter discusses the existing research on threat identification and mitigation for au-
tonomous vehicles. It is divided into two sections. The first section talks about the state of the art
on identifying potential cyber attacks on automated vehicles. The second section discusses existing
techniques and tools for recovering architecture from source code.
3.1 Security and Privacy in Automated Vehicles
The developments of ”self-driving” cars attract a lot of research to the field of Intelligent Trans-
portation Systems. There have been related work in the past focusing on the communication of
data among vehicles (V2V) and/or between vehicles and the infrastructure (V2I/I2V) to provide
the information needed to implement ITS applications[8]. We summarize in the following, the
surveys in security and privacy of autonomous vehicle. The state of the art research on threats to
autonomous vehicles describe the attacks on self-driving cars.
3.1.1 Surveys
Othmane et al.[9] identified a taxonomy for security and privacy aspects of connected vehicle.
The aspects were: security of communication links, data validity, security of devices, identity and
liability, access control, and privacy of drivers and vehicles. Then, they use the taxonomy to
classify the main threats to connected vehicles, and existing solutions that address the threats. In
addition, they report about an approach to verify security and privacy architecture of connected
vehicle and point the importance of the taxonomy and the survey to develop security solutions for
smart mobility applications.
Le et al.[24] surveyed the security and privacy challenges in the autonomous cars with the
goal of research and development of security and privacy solutions suitable for intelligent con-
9nected vehicles. They concluded that, despite extensive research in the area, there are several open
challenges. By studying automotive applications and platforms and comparing their security and
privacy requirements with the state of the art of related security and privacy solutions, the authors
identified key gaps in data collection, automotive ethernet, gateway firewall, intrusion detection
and response, and Public Key Infrastructure for Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network. They concluded that
these gaps hinder societal acceptance, and thus the deployment of connected vehicles at large scale.
3.1.2 Threats to Self-Driving Cars
Petit[8], in his paper investigated the potential cyberattacks on automated vehicles. He
reported results identifying some of the cybersecurity threats to automated vehicles, with estimates
of the severity of these threats and potential strategies for mitigating or overcoming them. The work
raises awareness of the importance of the issue and automated vehicles and propose countermeasures
that can be applied to overcome them.
According to Mamun[25], technological development of automated vehicles opened novel cy-
bersecurity threats and risks for road safety. Increased connectivity often results in increased risks
of a cybersecurity attacks; these risks are the main challenges of the automotive industry that
undergoes a profound transformation. Mamun reviewed the techniques devised by state of the
art research on these threats and showed that some of the different solutions complement each
other while others overlap or are even incompatible or contradictory. Based on this gap analysis,
he proposed an integrated and comprehensive approach to mitigate cyber threats in automated
vehicles.
Othmane et al.[26] extended Ruddle et al.[27] work on assessing the security risks of connected
vehicles analyzing the likelihood of seven threats to connected vehicles estimates of nine security
experts. The results show that the likelihood ratings of six out of seven threats to connected vehicle
are “very unlikely.” This contrasts the current assumption that the threats to connected vehicles
are lab experiments. It also shows that connected vehicles require fast attacks, potential attackers
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need to be security experts and have deep knowledge about their targets, and developing such
attacks does not require long time, neither expensive equipment and tools.
Ben Othmane et al.[9] emphasized the development of security and privacy solutions for
smart mobility applications (applications that use information generated by vehicles; e.g., cooper-
ative adaptive cruise control) requires considering threats to the system that integrates in-vehicle
network, VANets, WPANs, and cellular network because they believe that an attacker on connected
vehicles has more capabilities to perform threats than an attacker on unconnected vehicles.
3.1.3 Attack on Self-Driving Cars
Miller et al.[28] tested the security of several self-driving cars in an attempt to identify and
address the challenges in securing autonomous vehicles. They described the foundations of self-
driving cars, the difference from passenger vehicles and the potential areas of risk. In addition, they
emphasize the importance of threat modeling for designing defenses that can sufficiently withstand
real attacks[28].
A white paper on Experimental Security Research on Tesla[29] by researchers in KeenLab
discovered that one can remotely gain the root privilege of APE(Tesla Autopilot ECU) and control
the steering system. They proved that the auto-wipers function can be disturbed and the Tesla car
can be mislead into the reverse lane with minor changes on the road.
3.2 Architecture Recovery
This section summarizes the recent research about the methods and techniques of architecture
recovery.
Sartipi et al.[30] present a model and an environment for recovering the high level design
of legacy software systems based on user defined architectural patterns and graph matching tech-
niques. They present high-level view of a software system in terms of the system components and
11
their interactions is represented as a query. In the solution, query maps onto a pattern-graph, where
a component and its interactions with other components are represented as a group of graph-nodes
and a group of graph-edges, respectively. Interaction constraints is modeled by the description
language as a part of the query. The pattern-graph is applied against an entity-relation graph that
represents the information extracted from the source code of the software system. An approximate
graph matching process performs a series of graph transformation operations (i.e., node/edge inser-
tion/deletion) on the pattern-graph and uses a ranking mechanism based on data mining association
to obtain a sub-optimal solution. The obtained solution corresponds to an extracted architecture
that complies with the given query.
Maqbool et al.[31] reviewed the literature on hierarchical clustering research in the context of
software architecture recovery and modularization. The authors employed clustering to understand
the peculiarities of the software domain, as well as the behavior of clustering measures and algo-
rithms in this domain. They also provide a detailed analysis of the behavior of various similarity
and distance measures that may be employed for software clustering. In addition, the clustering
process of various well-known clustering algorithms by using multiple criteria and shared the impact
of arbitrary decisions taken by these algorithms during clustering affect the quality of their results.
Lung[32] interprets software architecture as critical for maintenance and evolution. He points
to the need for a systematic and effective approach to help the designer to restructure or re-engineer
an architecture for improvement. They present an approach based on clustering techniques for
software architecture restructuring and re-engineering as well as for software architecture recov-
ery. Clustering techniques are built on top of reverse engineering tools. The approach has been
applied to several examples at various levels of abstraction. He demonstrated using two case stud-
ies:(1)empirical study of a decoupling effort for a real-time telecommunications system, (2)example
that shows a research potential to enforce the designer to improve an architecture by adopting a
design pattern based on the clustering results.
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On the same lines of work, Mancoridis et al.[21] state that software systems are typically
modified in order to extend or change their functionality, improve their performance, port them to
different platforms, and so on. The authors points that it is crucial to understand the structure of
a system before attempting to modify it. They describe a Bunch, clustering tool for decomposing
automatically a software by treating clustering as an optimization problem. The tool is extended to
integrate designer knowledge about the system structure into an otherwise fully automatic clustering
process.
Finally, as these works describe various techniques for software architecture recovery. Lutellier
et al.[33] present a thorough comparison of the recovery techniques to understand their effectiveness
and applicability. First, they study the impact of leveraging more accurate symbol dependencies
on the accuracy of architecture recovery techniques. They considered the impact of quality of the
input on the quality of the output for architecture recovery techniques. Second, they studied a
system(Chromium) that is substantially larger(9.7 million lines of code) than those included in
previous studies. Note that obtaining the ground-truth architecture of Chromium involved two
years of collaboration with its developers.
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CHAPTER 4. APOLLO AUTO
This chapter discusses Apollo Auto, the autonomous vehicle software which is used as a case
scenario for our hypothesis. For the purpose of our testing, the study and understanding of this
software is vital. In this chapter, the core software modules, architecture and the working of its
components are discussed.
4.1 About
Apollo auto is an open autonomous driving platform developed by Baidu Corporation. Apollo
has eight github repositories[34]. It has over 300 contributors and is partnered with over 135
renowned automobile manufacturing companies like BMW, Volvo and Volkswagen[35]. For the
purpose of our research, we used Apollo version 3.0. It requires docker and an Ubuntu OS. The
figures 4.1 and 4.2 indicate the locations of the four major components (GPS Antenna, IPC, GPS
Receiver and LiDAR) installed on the vehicle.
4.2 Core Software Modules and Their Functions
Table 4.1 depicts the core software modules running on the Apollo 3.0 powered autonomous
vehicle.
Apollo Auto fundamentally use the same basic structure as of any autonomous vehicle. Autonomous
vehicles(AV) are controlled through Controller Area Network bus(CAN bus) to compute concisely,
the location of the vehicle, perception for the vehicle and planning the routes. Figure 4.4 illustrates
an example of the dreamview window that is the graphical representation of the controls and the
functions provided on the autonomous vehicle using Apollo auto software. Table 4.1 illustrates the
14
Figure 4.1 Hardware components[1]
Figure 4.2 Rear view of the vehicle[1]
15
Table 4.1 Core software modules and their functions
Core Software modules Functionality
Perception The perception module identifies the world surrounding the
autonomous vehicle. These are two important sub-modules
inside perception : obstacle detection and traffic light detec-
tion.
Prediction The prediction module anticipates the future motion trajec-
tories of the perceived obstacles.
Routing The routing modules tells the autonomous vehicle how to
reach its destination via a series of lanes or roads.
Planning The planning modules plans the spatio-temporal trajectory
for the autonomous vehicle to take.
Control The control module executes the planned spatio-temporal
trajectory by generating control commands such as throttle,
brake, and steering.
Canbus The Canbus is the interface that passes control commands to
the vehicle hardware. It also passes chassis information to
the software system.
HD-Map This module is similar to a library. Instead of publishing
and subscribing messages, it frequently functions as query
engineer support to provide ad-hoc structured information
regarding the roads.
Localization This localization module leverages various information
sources such as GPS, LiDAR and IMU to estimate where
the autonomous vehicle is located.
HMI Human Machine Interface or Dreamview in Apollo is a mod-
ule for viewing the status of the vehicle, testing other modules
and controlling the functioning of the vehicle in real-time.
Monitor The surveillance system of all the modules in the vehicle in-
cluding hardware.
Guardian A safety module that performs the function of an Action
Center and intervenes should Monitor detect a failure.
16
Figure 4.3 Interaction of the software modules[2]
Figure 4.4 Dreamview window[1]
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core software modules running on the Apollo 3.0 powered autonomous vehicle. Apollo 3.0 consists
of 11 core software modules with each one of them having a specific set of functions detailed in
table 4.1. Figure 4.3 illustrates the interactions of these modules 4.3.
The perception module incorporates the capability of using five cameras (two front, two on
either side and one rear) and two radars (front and rear) along with three 16-line LiDARs (two
rear and one front) and one 128-line LiDAR to recognize obstacles and fuse their individual tracks
to obtain a final track list[36].
The prediction module estimates the future motion trajectories for all the perceived obsta-
cles. The output prediction message wraps the perception information. Prediction subscribes to
localization, planning and perception obstacle messages[36].
The localization module aggregates various data to locate the autonomous vehicle[36]. The
routing module needs to know the routing start point and routing end point, to compute the passage
lanes and roads. Usually the routing start point is the autonomous vehicle location[36].
Apollo 3.5 uses several information sources to plan a safe and collision free trajectory, so the
planning module interacts with almost every other module[36].
The Control module takes the planned trajectory as input, and generates the control com-
mand to pass to CanBus[36].
Human Machine Interface(HMI) or DreamView in Apollo is a web application that visualizes
the current output of relevant autonomous driving modules, e.g. planning trajectory, car localiza-
tion, chassis status, etc. and provides human-machine interface for user to view hardware status,
turn on/off of modules, and start the autonomous driving car[36].
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Monitor is surveillance system of all the modules in the vehicle including hardware. It receives
data from different modules and passes them on to HMI for the driver to view and ensure that all
the modules are working without any issue[36].
Guardian allows the flow of control to work normally. Control signals are sent to CANBus as
if Guardian were not present. Module crash is detected by Monitor - if there is a failure detected
by Monitor, Guardian will prevent Control signals from reaching CANBus and bring the car to a
stop[36].
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CHAPTER 5. ARCHITECTURE RECOVERY
Software architecture recovery is a set of methods for the extraction of architectural information
from lower level representations of a software system, such as source code. The abstraction process
to generate architectural elements frequently involves clustering source code entities (such as files,
classes, functions etc.) into subsystems according to a set of criteria that can be application
dependent or not[33].
5.1 Approach to Architecture Recovery
Figure 5.1 illustrates the LLVM compiler framework. LLVM is designed around a language-
independent intermediate representation (LLVM IR) that serves as a portable, high-level assembly
language that can be optimized with a variety of transformations over multiple passes.
This work created the callgraph of the system and clustered the callgraph using Bunch tool
to recover subsystems. To build callgraph, we employed LLVM and used this compiler framework
to create Intermediate Representations(IR). In the next step, we linked the Intermediate Represen-
tations and fed it into a LLVM command ’opt’ to create a callgraph.
Figure 5.1 LLVM Framework[3]
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Listing 5.1 Code snippet for compiling modules of Apollo
baze l bu i ld // modules/ pe rcept i on : a l l
baze l bu i ld // modules/ monitor : a l l
Listing 5.2 Code snippet of a C program
i n t f ( i n t a , i n t b) {
re turn a + 2∗b ;
}
i n t main ( ) {
re turn f (10 , 2 0 ) ;
}
5.2 Compiling the Apollo Project
A tool named Bazel[37] is used for building the entire project of Apollo Auto. Code snippet
5.1 illustrates the command line used to build the two core software modules of perception and
monitor. In a similar way to the code snippet 5.1, we built the other core software modules. Each
software module should be before moving to the command line to create LLVM IR for each file.
5.3 Obtaining Intermediate Representation
LLVM IR is a low-level intermediate representation used by the LLVM compiler framework.
In other words, LLVM IR is a platform-independent assembly language with an infinite number of
function local registers. Listing 5.3 shows the LLVM IR code generated by clang, for the C code in
listing 5.2.
To get a glimpse of what LLVM IR assembly may look like, consider the following C program
in listing 5.2.
Each file in the software modules(with source code in C++) of Apollo Auto is created into their
corresponding LLVM IR files and then linked together to give a single IR file for the entire system
software. Line 1 and Line 2 of code listing 5.4 depicts the used LLVM commands ’emit-llvm’ and
’llvm-link’ to create the LLVM IR of Apollo Auto.
21
Listing 5.3 LLVM IR assembly of the code snippet
d e f i n e i 32 @f ( i 32 %a , i 32 %b) {
; <l abe l >:0
%1 = mul i 32 2 , %b
%2 = add i32 %a , %1
r e t i 32 %2
}
d e f i n e i 32 @main ( ) {
; <l abe l >:0
%1 = c a l l i 32 @f ( i 32 10 , i 32 20)
r e t i 32 %1
}
Listing 5.4 Code snippet for obtaining LLVM IR
1 clang −3.6 −s −emit−l lvm ∗ . cc
2 llvm−l i nk −3.6 −s −v −o s i n g l e . l l ∗ . l l
3 opt−3.6 −pr int−c a l l g r a p h s i n g l e . l l
5.4 Building Callgraph
The command used to create the callgraph is ’opt’. The ’opt’ command is the modular LLVM
optimizer and analyzer. It takes LLVM source files as input, runs the specified optimizations on
it, and then outputs the optimized file[38]. We first compile the core module files as discussed in
section 5.2. Line 3 in code listing 5.4 illustrates the usage of ’opt’ command over the single LLVM
IR file of the entire software system obtained after linking(described in the previous section) to
create the Callgraph of the entire system of Apollo Auto.
The output callgraph of Apollo Auto contained 12072 nodes.
5.5 Clustering Algorithm Over the Callgraph
Figure 5.2 illustrates the approach followed by the Bunch tool.
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Figure 5.2 Bunch Approach to partitioning and visualization[4]
Bunch tool accepts as input a description of a software system’s structure in the form of
a Module Dependency Graph (MDG). The vertices of the MDG represent the software compo-
nents(e.g. C++ classes or C++ functions) and the edge represents the inter-module dependen-
cies(e.g., procedure calls, inherits).
Bunch tool currently supports four algorithms that are based on treating the clustering pro-
cess as an optimization problem. The ”optimal” algorithm produces the best results, but is only
practical for small MDGs(i.e., 15 vertices). Two additional hill climbing algorithms and a genetic
algorithm produces sub-optimal, but acceptable, results on large systems. All the algorithms are
based on maximizing the ”quality” of a particular partition of the MDG.
We used the Callgraph of Apollo auto created in the previous section as an input to the Bunch
tool. The callgraph is a MDG with the nodes depicting the functions of Apollo Auto and the edges
representing the inter-function calls[39]. We used the hill-climbing algorithm for clustering the
callgraph of Apollo auto. Figure 5.3 illustrates the working window of bunch tool. It depicts the
selection of algorithms used and other bunch metrics.
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Figure 5.3 Screenshot of Bunch tool used on Apollo Auto
5.6 Result of Clustering and Automation to Identify the Root Modules from
the Clusters
Bunch Clustering resulted in an output file containing 40 clusters. Each cluster contained a set
of function nodes from the callgraph. The tool did not specify the source file of each cluster node.
The challenge was to identify each function node to its source file. For this purpose, we created
a python script that takes in input the clustered file and the source files from which the MDG
was created and outputs the cluster nodes with its source file. This script is been provided in the
Appendix A.1. The output of this algorithm is a file that provides for each node in a cluster, its
source file. This output file with the identified source files for each node helped us to understand
the function of the clusters. In the next step, we analyzed the behaviour of each of these clusters
manually which helps us for a step named Cluster matching in our threat modeling process which
is discussed in Chapter 7 of this report.
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CHAPTER 6. APPROACH
This chapter discusses the approach towards threat modeling undertaken to address the research
question. The chapter is divided into four sections.
The first section describes the template of threat modeling. It explains the steps of threat
modeling. The second section describes the application of this template on the architecture of
Apollo Auto software[40]. The third section explains the application of this template on the
ground-truth architecture of Apollo Auto software. The fourth section discusses the application this
template on the recovered architecture of Apollo Auto software that was obtained from Chapter 5.
6.1 The Template of Threat Modelling Process
A threat is a possible harm that may occur due to vulnerability present in the design of software
applications. When vulnerability in the design of systems is exploited, threat is materialized and
attack happens. The first step of that model is making secure software applications is to identify
all possible threats to the system, a task called threat modelling. Threat modelling is a technique
that makes software systems more secure by including security measures into the design of software
systems[41].
The process of creating a threat model for this research follows the general outline of the
threat modeling process described by Adam Shostack[42]. The first step involves identification of
components or assets from the architecture of the software. In the next step, we obtained the
functions of each component from either the documentation provided by Baidu Developers(Given
Architecture)[43] or by manually inspecting the source code associated for each component(Ground-
truth and Recovered Architecture). We then identified the target attack surfaces from each com-
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Figure 6.1 Given Architecture
ponent based on its functions and its incoming and outgoing data patterns. Threats are then
identified for each of these target attack surface using the template by Petit[8].
6.2 Threat Modeling Using the Given Architecture
Given Architecture is obtained from the developers at Baidu[40]. Figure 6.1 shows the given
architecture. We considered the given architecture as input to the threat modeling process. In the
first step, we decomposed the architecture to identify the components of the system. The system
has 13 components based on the architecture. The functionality of these components was identified
in the second step. The functions of the components of the given architecture are obtained from
the documentation hosted by the developers at Baidu[43]. They described the functions for each
component. The functions are then manually analyzed to identify the target attack surfaces. Each
target attack surface exposes a set of attack techniques from the point of view of an attacker. We
use the template provided by Petit[8] to identify the threats to each target surface.
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Table 6.1 Threat modeling of given architecture(Partial table from Table A.1)
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
Perception Obstacle de-
tection, traffic
light detection,
raw sensor
data from
LiDAR point
cloud data and
camera data.
Machine vision
GPS
LiDAR
Electronic
device
Map
Acoustic sen-
sors
In-vehicle
sensors
Machine vision
1.blind(only source of information)
2.fake picture/emergency brake light(only
source of information)
GPS
1.Spoofing
2.Jamming
Lidar
1.Jamming
2.smart material(absorbent, reflective)
Electronic Device
Electromagnetic Pulse
Map
Map poisoning
Acoustic sensors
Interference (electromagnetic, loud sound,
inaudible)
fake crash sound
fake ultrasonic reflection
in-vehicle sensors
Eavesdropping(tire pressure, bluetooth)
Eavesdropping CAN bus
Inject CAN messages
Table 6.1 illustrates an example of how a component is analyzed to provide a comprehensive
list of identified attack surfaces and identified threats. Note that this table is a partial table and
the complete table is provided in the appendix in Table A.1.
6.3 Threat Modeling Using the Ground-truth Architecture
The ground truth architecture is obtained by the author from precise manual examination and
inspection of the source code of Apollo Auto software from Github[44].
27
Figure 6.2 Ground-truth Architecture
The source code of Apollo Auto consists of 11 core software modules. Each software module
contains a collection of classes and functions to perform specific tasks. We investigated each build
file and reviewed source code files to understand the dependencies and classify components for the
first step in threat modeling process. The architecture that is obtained from manual inspection
of the source code is the ground-truth architecture. The Figure 6.2 illustrates the ground truth
architecture of Apollo Auto.
Application of the same pattern of disintegrating the architecture to define components pro-
duces 11 components. The functionality of each of these components are determined based on
manual analysis of the source code from github associated with each component that is identified.
The target attack surfaces is identified corresponding to each component using its functionality.
We apply the template by Petit et. al.[8] to identify the threats to each target surface.
The Table 6.2 illustrates an example of how a component is analyzed to provide a compre-
hensive list of identified attack surfaces and identified threats. Note that this table is a partial
table and the complete table is provided in the appendix in Table A.2.
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Table 6.2 Threat modeling of ground-truth architecture( Partial table from Table A.2)
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
Prediction Planning tra-
jectory of
the previous
computing
cycle from
the planning
module
GPS
LiDAR
Electronic
device
Infrastructure
sign
GPS
1. Spoofing
2. Jamming
Lidar
1. Jamming
2. smart material(absorbent, reflective)
Electronic Device
Electromagnetic Pulse
Infrastructure sign
1.Change sign (fake, irrelevant)
2.Alter(change speed), make it unreadable
6.4 Threat Modeling Using the Recovered Architecture
The sub-section describes the the process of cluster matching. This sub-section contains two
tables. The tables explain the application of cluster matching with given architecture and ground-
truth architecture respectively.
The recovered architecture of Apollo auto is obtained by applying the approach illustrated
in chapter 5. It contains 40 clusters that are formed by creating callgraph of the software system
and then clustering the callgraph using hill-climbing algorithm. The clusters have been inspected
for their function that they perform and have been matched to the ground-truth architecture
components. Because each cluster contains a collection of functions, the relationship between the
clusters and the matched components is many to many.
6.4.1 Alignments of the Given Architecture, Recovered and Ground-truth Architec-
ture
This section outlines the process of matching clusters to the components described in the ar-
chitecture. Each cluster is inspected for a set of functionality that it serves by manually analyzing
the function nodes it consists of and inspecting function code of the function nodes. Each cluster is
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matched to the appropriate component whose functionality is the same as the cluster in the given
and the ground-truth architecture respectively.
Table 6.3 illustrates an example of how a component from given architecture is aligned with
the clusters. Each cluster is analyzed to provide target attack surfaces to provide a comprehensive
list of identified threats. Note that this table is a partial table and the complete table is provided
in the appendix in Table A.4 .
The Table 6.4 illustrates an example of how a component from ground-truth architecture is
aligned with the clusters. Each cluster is analyzed to provide target attack surfaces to provide a
comprehensive list of identified threats. Note that this table is a partial table and the complete
table is provided in the appendix in Table A.3.
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Table 6.3 Cluster Alignment to Given Architecture(Partial table from Table A.4)
Given Ar-
chitecture
Component
Aligned
Clusters
Target Surface Threats
Prediction 0 4 16 17 25 GPS
LiDAR
Electronic
device
Map
In-vehicle sen-
sors
Acoustic sen-
sors
Machine vision
Machine vision
1.blind(only source of information)
2.fake picture/emergency brake light(only
source of information)
GPS
1.Spoofing
2.Jamming
Lidar
1.Jamming
2.smart material(absorbent, reflective)
Electronic Device
Electromagnetic Pulse
Map
Map poisoning
Acoustic sensors
1.Interference (electromagnetic, loud sound,
inaudible)
2.fake crash sound
3.fake ultrasonic reflection
in-vehicle sensors
1.Eavesdropping(tire pressure, bluetooth)
2.Eavesdropping CAN bus
3.Inject CAN messages
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Table 6.4 Cluster Alignment to Ground-Truth Architecture(Partial table from Table A.3)
Ground-truth
Architecture
Component
Aligned
Clusters
Target Surface Threats
Prediction 0 4 16 17 25 GPS
LiDAR
Electronic
device
Map
In-vehicle sen-
sors
Acoustic sen-
sors
Machine vision
Machine vision
1.blind(only source of information)
2.blind(other source of information available)
3.fake picture/emergency brake light(only
source of information)
4.fake picture/emergency brake light (other
source of information available)
GPS
1.Spoofing
2.Jamming
Lidar
1.Jamming
2.smart material(absorbent, reflective)
Electronic Device
Electromagnetic Pulse
Map
Map poisoning
Acoustic sensors
1.Interference (electromagnetic, loud sound,
inaudible)
2.fake crash sound
3.fake ultrasonic reflection
in-vehicle sensors
1.Eavesdropping(tire pressure, bluetooth)
2.Eavesdropping CAN bus
3.Inject CAN messages
32
CHAPTER 7. RESULTS
We applied threat modeling based on three architectures of Apollo Auto software - given ar-
chitecture, ground-truth architecture and recovered architecture. The results and the comparison
between the threat models are summarized in the appendix in the tables A.1, A.2, A.4 and A.3.
7.1 Findings
This section discuss the findings of our research. We found that the Given Architecture con-
tains 12 components. The Ground-truth architecture contains 10 components and the Recovered
architecture resulted in 40 clusters which aligned to the components in given architecture and the
ground truth architecture.
7.1.1 Comparing Threat Models Based on the Given Architecture and the Ground-
truth Architecture
The similarities between the given architecture and ground-truth architecture are that the nine
components from ground truth architecture aligned to the nine components of the given architecture
as is described in the previous chapter under ”Alignments of the Given architecture, Recovered
and Ground-truth architecture”. The difference between the two architectures is that HMI and
Navigator from the given architecture did not have a alignment to any software module and hence
did not have aligned components in the ground-truth architecture.
Table A.3 in the appendix depicts the difference in attack surfaces identified and the justification
for the gap between the threat models.
We learned that following the threat modelling template for Apollo Auto using ground-truth
architecture, we identified additional attack surfaces than the ones that would be identified using
given architecture. Thus, there were additional security threats on components such as Prediction,
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Planning, Control, CanBus and Monitor. Thus, these components will fail the security tests if they
are tested for attacks on these additional attack surfaces identified using ground-truth architecture.
This will be an attacker’s advantage.
7.1.2 Comparing Threat Models Based on the Given Architecture and the Recovered
Architecture
We aligned the 40 clusters of the recovered architecture to the 12 components of the given
architecture. The differences are that Guardian component in the given architecture did not have a
matching cluster. Similarly, HD Maps, relative map, HMI and navigator for the given architecture
did not have a matching clusters. All the components matched according to the clusters indicate
higher identified attack surfaces than the one identified using only reported architecture. Thus,
there are increased number of threats identified using Automated recovery architecture.
The components that did not align with the clusters were not coded in C++ and thus could
not bee analyzed using LLVM compiler for Automated recovery.
Table A.4 in the appendix depicts the difference in threat surfaces detected and the possible
justification for the gap between the threat models.
We learned that following the threat modelling template for Apollo Auto using recovered
architecture, we identified additional attack surfaces than the ones that would be identified using
given architecture. Thus, there were additional security threats on components such as Prediction,
Planning, Control, CanBus, Localization and Monitor. Thus, these components will fail the security
tests if they are tested for attacks on these additional attack surfaces identified using ground-truth
architecture.
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7.1.3 Comparing Threat Models Obtained based on Ground-truth Architecture and
Recovered Architecture
The ground-truth and the recovered architecture could be easily aligned. The component Maps
did not have an aligned cluster. In addition, the automated recovery lists many threats as opposed
to the manual recovery.
The complete table providing the gap in the threat models of ground-truth and recovered
architecture are provided in Table A.3
We learned that following the threat modelling template for Apollo Auto using recovered
architecture, we identified additional attack surfaces than the ones that would be identified using
ground-truth architecture. Thus, there were additional security threats on components such as
Prediction, Planning, Control, CanBus, v2x and Common. Thus, these components will fail the
security tests if they are tested for attacks on these additional attack surfaces identified using
ground-truth architecture. This will be an advantage to the attacker.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
Autonomous vehicles are becoming a widely used technology and the complex, connected and
extensible nature of these vehicles make them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. Threat models
are one way to forsee the potential threats in order to design safety mechanisms. However, the
software architecture of an autonomous vehicle is complicated and the architecture documented
by architects at the start of the project development may differ considerably from the actual
implemented architecture. Threat models developed using this reported architecture might miss
out on identifying some of the threats.
This report presented three architectures of Apollo Auto, a widely used open source au-
tonomous vehicle software. The three architectures consisted of: Given architecture(reported by
developers at Baidu), Ground-truth architecture(manually verified using source code) and the re-
covered architecture(using static program analysis and clustering). The research focused on creating
threat models based on each of these architectures and identifying the similarities and differences
between them.
We found that the threat model of given architecture and the ground truth architecture lacked
the identification of few attack surfaces which were identified when threat modelling with recovered
architecture such as the identification of In-vehicle Sensors as an attack surface for the Control
component that implied that the Control component will be compromised if the In-vehicle sensors
was attacked by injecting CAN messages. Hence, we assert that semi-automated threat modelling
using recovered architecture provided a detailed and more intense identification of threats to Apollo
Auto.
The impact of this research will improve the security testings and security mechanisms for
autonomous vehicles. By identifying all the attack surfaces and hence the associated threats to
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each attack surface, security engineers can effectively conduct security tests for each component
and implement security requirements to protect them from such security attacks.
However, there are three limitations of this study. First, the main limitation of this thesis is,
that the approach is experimented with only one application. For better assessment of the approach,
it should be applied to more than one use case scenario. Second, the ground-truth architecture of
Apollo Auto could not be verified from the team of Baidu. So, there is a possibility that the actual
architecture of Apollo Auto may differ slightly from the one we extracted in chapter 4. Third,
autonomous vehicle systems are a combination of software and hardware components and in this
report the proposed approach addresses only software related threats. The approach needs to be
expanded with more work to experiment with other applications and also to extract hardware level
threats and then correlate them with the software threats.
37
Bibliography
[1] : Github - apolloauto/apollo: An open autonomous driving platform. https://github.com/
ApolloAuto/apollo (Accessed on 07/08/2019).
[2] : apollo/apollo 3.5 software architecture.md at master · apolloauto/apollo · github.
https://github.com/ApolloAuto/apollo/blob/master/docs/specs/Apollo_3.5_
Software_Architecture.md (Accessed on 07/08/2019).
[3] Zhao, J., Nagarakatte, S., Martin, M.M., Zdancewic, S.: Formalizing the llvm intermediate
representation for verified program transformations. In: Acm sigplan notices. Volume 47.,
ACM (2012) 427–440
[4] Mitchell, B.S., Mancoridis, S.: Modeling the search landscape of metaheuristic software clus-
tering algorithms. In: Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference, Springer (2003)
2499–2510
[5] Myagmar, S., Lee, A.J., Yurcik, W.: Threat modeling as a basis for security requirements.
In: Symposium on requirements engineering for information security (SREIS). Volume 2005.,
Citeseer (2005) 1–8
[6] Swiderski, F., Snyder, W.: Threat modeling. Microsoft Press (2004)
[7] Bass, L., Clements, P., Kazman, R.: Software architecture in practice. Addison-Wesley
Professional (2003)
[8] Petit, J., Shladover, S.E.: Potential cyberattacks on automated vehicles. IEEE Transactions
on Intelligent Transportation Systems 16(2) (2014) 546–556
[9] Othmane, L.B., Weffers, H., Mohamad, M.M., Wolf, M. In: A Survey of Security and Privacy
in Connected Vehicles. Springer New York, New York, NY (2015) 217–247
38
[10] Wichmann, B., Canning, A., Clutterbuck, D., Winsborrow, L., Ward, N., Marsh, D.: Industrial
perspective on static analysis. Software Engineering Journal 10(2) (1995) 69–75
[11] Lowry, E.S., Medlock, C.W.: Object code optimization. Communications of the ACM 12(1)
(1969) 13–22
[12] : Call graph - wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Call_graph (Accessed on
07/03/2019).
[13] Hall, M.W., Kennedy, K.: Efficient call graph analysis. ACM Letters on Programming Lan-
guages and Systems (LOPLAS) 1(3) (1992) 227–242
[14] Medvidovic, N., Taylor, R.N.: Software architecture: foundations, theory, and practice.
In: Proceedings of the 32nd ACM/IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering-
Volume 2, ACM (2010) 471–472
[15] Cuesta, C.E., Garlan, D., Pe´rez, J.: Software Architecture: 12th European Conference on Soft-
ware Architecture, ECSA 2018, Madrid, Spain, September 24–28, 2018, Proceedings. Volume
11048. Springer (2018)
[16] Lattner, C., Adve, V.: Llvm: A compilation framework for lifelong program analysis &
transformation. In: Proceedings of the international symposium on Code generation and
optimization: feedback-directed and runtime optimization, IEEE Computer Society (2004) 75
[17] Lattner, C., Adve, V.: The llvm compiler framework and infrastructure tutorial. In: In-
ternational Workshop on Languages and Compilers for Parallel Computing, Springer (2004)
15–16
[18] : Llvm language reference manual — llvm 9 documentation. https://llvm.org/docs/
LangRef.html (Accessed on 06/22/2019).
39
[19] : Github - llvm-mirror/llvm: Mirror of official llvm git repository located at
http://llvm.org/git/llvm. updated every five minutes. https://github.com/llvm-mirror/
llvm (Accessed on 06/23/2019).
[20] : Llvm download page. http://releases.llvm.org/download.html (Accessed on
06/23/2019).
[21] Mancoridis, S., Mitchell, B.S., Chen, Y., Gansner, E.R.: Bunch: A clustering tool for the
recovery and maintenance of software system structures. In: Proceedings IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Software Maintenance-1999 (ICSM’99).’Software Maintenance for Busi-
ness Change’(Cat. No. 99CB36360), IEEE (1999) 50–59
[22] : Github - architectingsoftware/bunch. https://github.com/ArchitectingSoftware/Bunch
(Accessed on 06/23/2019).
[23] : Spiros mancoridis’ bunch sofware download page. https://www.cs.drexel.edu/~spiros/
bunch/ (Accessed on 06/23/2019).
[24] : Elsevier enhanced reader. https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/
S014036641731174X?token=8B8B4682B2BF41CB3336B936950171D3F7EC9C24653C8628727188F3B06D77DA18B04969D346E96377EE8E2A0DD488DC
(Accessed on 06/16/2019).
[25] Al Mamun, A., Al Mamun, M.A., Shikfa, A.: Challenges and mitigation of cyber threat in
automated vehicle: An integrated approach. In: 2018 International Conference of Electrical
and Electronic Technologies for Automotive, IEEE (2018) 1–6
[26] Othmane, L.B., Fernando, R., Ranchal, R., Bhargava, B., Bodden, E.: Likelihood of threats
to connected vehicles. International Journal of Next-Generation Computing (IJNGC) 5(3)
(2014) 1–14
[27] : Security risk analysis approach for on-board vehicle networks. https://www.
evita-project.org/Publications/Rud10.pdf (Accessed on 06/17/2019).
40
[28] : securing self driving cars.pdf. http://illmatics.com/securing_self_driving_cars.pdf
(Accessed on 06/16/2019).
[29] : Autopilot. https://keenlab.tencent.com/en/whitepapers/Experimental_Security_
Research_of_Tesla_Autopilot.pdf (Accessed on 06/16/2019).
[30] Sartipi, K.: Software architecture recovery based on pattern matching. In: International
Conference on Software Maintenance, 2003. ICSM 2003. Proceedings., IEEE (2003) 293–296
[31] Maqbool, O., Babri, H.: Hierarchical clustering for software architecture recovery. IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering 33(11) (2007) 759–780
[32] : isaw-3-98.2.columns.fm. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.
1.119.148&rep=rep1&type=pdf (Accessed on 06/16/2019).
[33] Lutellier, T., Chollak, D., Garcia, J., Tan, L., Rayside, D., Medvidovic, N., Kroeger, R.:
Comparing software architecture recovery techniques using accurate dependencies. In: 2015
IEEE/ACM 37th IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering. Volume 2., IEEE
(2015) 69–78
[34] : Apollo auto · github. https://github.com/ApolloAuto (Accessed on 06/23/2019).
[35] : Apollo. http://apollo.auto/index.html (Accessed on 06/23/2019).
[36] : apollo/apollo 3.5 software architecture.md at master · apolloauto/apollo. https:
//github.com/ApolloAuto/apollo/blob/master/docs/specs/Apollo_3.5_Software_
Architecture.md (Accessed on 07/15/2019).
[37] : Bazel - a fast, scalable, multi-language and extensible build system” - bazel. https:
//bazel.build/ (Accessed on 07/30/2019).
[38] : opt - llvm optimizer — llvm 9 documentation. http://llvm.org/docs/CommandGuide/
opt.html (Accessed on 06/23/2019).
41
[39] : Call graph - wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Call_graph (Accessed on
07/16/2019).
[40] : Apollo. http://apollo.auto/ (Accessed on 06/18/2019).
[41] Hussain, S., Kamal, A., Ahmad, S., Rasool, G., Iqbal, S.: Threat modelling methodologies: a
survey. Sci. Int.(Lahore) 26(4) (2014) 1607–1609
[42] Shostack, A.: Threat modeling: Designing for security. John Wiley & Sons (2014)
[43] : apollo/apollo 3.5 technical tutorial.md at master · apolloauto/apollo · github.
https://github.com/ApolloAuto/apollo/blob/master/docs/technical_tutorial/
apollo_3.5_technical_tutorial.md (Accessed on 06/18/2019).
[44] : Github - apolloauto/apollo: An open autonomous driving platform. https://github.com/
ApolloAuto/apollo (Accessed on 06/18/2019).
42
A. Appendix
43
Table A.1: Threat modeling of given architecture
Begin of Table
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
Perception 1.Obstacle detection
2.Traffic light detection
Machine vision
GPS
LiDAR
Electronic device
Map
Acoustic sensors
In-vehicle sensors
Machine vision:
1.blind(only source of information)
2.fake picture/emergency brake light(only
source of information)
GPS:Spoofing,Jamming
Lidar:Jamming
Electronic Device:Electromagnetic Pulse
Map:Map poisoning
Acoustic sensors:
1.Interference
2.fake crash sound
3.fake ultrasonic reflection
In-vehicle sensors:
1.Eavesdropping(tire pressure, bluetooth)
2.Eavesdropping CAN bus
3.Inject CAN messages
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Continuation of Table A.1
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
Prediction Planning trajectory of the pre-
vious computing cycle from
the planning module
GPS
Electronic Device
LiDAR
Infrastructure sign
GPS:Spoofing,Jamming
Lidar
1.Jamming
2.smart material(absorbent, reflective)
Electronic Device
Electromagnetic Pulse
Infrastructure sign
1.Change sign (fake, irrelevant)
2.Alter(change speed)
3.Make it unreadable
Planning Deciders and Optimizer Maps Map
Map poisoning
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Continuation of Table A.1
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
Control 1.Planning trajectory
2.Car status
3.Localization
4.Dreamview AUTO mode
change request
Infrastructure sign
Road
GPS
Electronic Device
LiDAR
Lidar
1.Jamming
2.smart material(absorbent, reflective)
Electronic Device
Electromagnetic Pulse
Infrastructure sign
1.Change sign (fake, irrelevant)
2.Alter(change speed), make it unreadable
Road
1.Modify delimination
2.Hack smart lane LEDs
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Continuation of Table A.1
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
Guardian 1.Guardian allows the flow of
control to work normally.
2.If there is a failure detected
by Monitor, Guardian will
prevent Control signals from
reaching CANBus and bring
the car to a stop.
3.If the Ultrasonic sensor is
running fine without detect-
ing an obstacle, Guardian will
bring the car to a slow stop.
Acoustic Sensors Acoustic sensors
1.Interference (electromagnetic, loud sound, in-
audible)
2.fake crash sound
3.fake ultrasonic reflection
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Continuation of Table A.1
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
CANBus Sending Control commands
like Chassis status.
In-vehicle sensors
Odometric sensors
In-vehicle devices
In-vehicle sensors
1.Eavesdropping(tire pressure, bluetooth)
2.Eavesdropping CAN bus
3.Inject CAN messages
Odometric sensors
1.Magnetic attack
2.Thermal attack of gyroscope
In-vehicle devices
1.Inject malware
2.Head unit attack
Monitor 1.Hardware related monitor-
ing, e.g. CAN card / GPS sta-
tus health check.
2.Check results are reported
back to HMI.
GPS
In-vehicle sensors
GPS
1.Spoofing
2.Jamming
In-vehicle sensors
1.Eavesdropping(tire pressure, bluetooth)
2.Eavesdropping CAN bus
3.Inject CAN messages
HDMap – Maps Map:Map poisoning
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Continuation of Table A.1
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
Localization 1.The RTK (Real Time Kine-
matic) based method which
incorporates GPS and IMU
(Inertial Measurement Unit)
information.
2.The multi-sensor fusion
method which incorporates
GPS, IMU, and LiDAR
information.
GPS
Electronic Device
LiDAR
GPS:
1.Spoofing
2.Jamming
Electronic Device:
Electromagnetic Pulse
Lidar:
1.Jamming
2.Smart material(absorbent,reflective)
Relative
Map
– Maps Map poisoning
HMI Visualizes the current output
of relevant autonomous driv-
ing modules.
Electronic device Electromagnetic pulse(EMP)
Navigator – Road Modify delineation
hack smart lan LEDs
End of Table
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Table A.2: Threat modeling of ground-truth architecture
Begin of Table
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
Perception 1.Obstacle detection
2.Traffic light detection
Machine vision
GPS
LiDAR
Electronic device
Map
Acoustic sensors
In-vehicle sensors
Machine vision:
1.blind(only source of information)
2.fake picture/emergency brake light(only
source of information)
GPS:Spoofing,Jamming
Lidar:Jamming
Electronic Device:Electromagnetic Pulse
Map:Map poisoning
Acoustic sensors:
1.Interference
2.fake crash sound
3.fake ultrasonic reflection
in-vehicle sensors:
1.Eavesdropping(tire pressure, Bluetooth)
2.Eavesdropping CAN bus
3.Inject CAN messages
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Continuation of Table A.2
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
Prediction Planning trajectory of the pre-
vious computing cycle from
the planning module
GPS
Electronic Device
LiDAR
Infrastructure sign
GPS
1.Spoofing
2.Jamming
Lidar
1.Jamming
2.Smart material(absorbent, reflective)
Electronic Device
Electromagnetic Pulse
Infrastructure sign
1.Change sign (fake, irrelevant)
2.Alter(change speed)
3.Make it unreadable
Planning Deciders and Optimizers Maps Map poisoning
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Continuation of Table A.2
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
Control 1.Planning trajectory
2.Car status
3.Localization
4.Dreamview AUTO mode
change request
Infrastructure sign
Road
GPS
Electronic Device
LiDAR
Lidar:
1.Jamming
2.smart material(absorbent, reflective)
Electronic Device:
Electromagnetic Pulse
Infrastructure sign:
1.Change sign (fake, irrelevant)
2.Alter(change speed), make it unreadable
Road:
1.Modify delimination
2.hack smart lane LEDs
Common This module contains code
that is not specific to any mod-
ule but is useful for the func-
tioning of Apollo.
No hardware attack surface as-
sociates here. This component
basically contains a lot of log-
ging files and mathematical li-
braries for setting up the other
components. It contains a lot
of testing modules.
None
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Continuation of Table A.2
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
CANBus Sending Control commands
like Chassis status.
In-vehicle sensors
Odometric sensors
In-vehicle devices
In-vehicle sensors:
1.Eavesdropping(tire pressure, bluetooth)
2.Eavesdropping CAN bus
3.Inject CAN messages
Odometric sensors:
1.Magnetic attack
2.Thermal attack of gyroscope
In-vehicle devices:
1.Inject malware
2.Head unit attack
Monitor 1.Hardware related monitor-
ing, e.g. CAN card / GPS sta-
tus health check.
2.Check results are reported
back to HMI.
GPS
In-vehicle sensors
GPS:
1.Spoofing
2.Jamming
In-vehicle sensors:
1.Eavesdropping(tire pressure, bluetooth)
2.Eavesdropping CAN bus
3.Inject CAN messages
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Continuation of Table A.2
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
Map – Maps Map
Map poisoning
Localization 1.The RTK (Real Time Kine-
matic) based method which
incorporates GPS and IMU
(Inertial Measurement Unit)
information.
2.The multi-sensor fusion
method which incorporates
GPS and LiDAR information.
GPS,
Electronic Device,
LiDAR
GPS:
1.Spoofing
2.Jamming
Electronic Device:
Electromagnetic Pulse
Lidar:
1.Jamming
2.smart material(absorbent,reflective)
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Continuation of Table A.2
Components Functionality Target Surface Threats
v2x Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) is
a vehicular communication
system that incorporates other
more specific types of com-
munication as V2I (vehicle-to-
infrastructure), V2N (vehicle-
to-network), V2V (vehicle-
to-vehicle), V2P (vehicle-to-
pedestrian), V2D (vehicle-to-
device) and V2G (vehicle-to-
grid).
Infrastructure sign
Electronic Device
Road
Infrastructure sign:
1.Change signs(fake,irrelevant)
2.Alter(change speed)
3.Make it unreadable
3.Remove(e.g. stop sign)
Electronic Device:
Electromagnetic Pulse
Road:
1.Modify delineation
2.Hack smart lan LEDs
End of Table
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Table A.3: Threat modeling with ground-truth architecture
and recovered architecture
Begin of Table
Ground-
truth Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Perception Machine vision
GPS
LiDAR
Electronic
device
Map
Acoustic sen-
sors
In-vehicle
sensors
0 2 7 18 26 30
32
LiDar
Machine vision
GPS
Electronic
device
Map
Acoustic sen-
sors
In-vehicle
sensors
None –
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Continuation of Table A.3
Ground-
truth Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Prediction GPS
Electronic
Device
LiDAR
Infrastructure
sign
0 4 16 17 25 Machine vision
GPS
LiDAR
Electronic
device
Map
Acoustic sen-
sors
In-vehicle
sensors
Machine vision
Map
Acoustic sen-
sors
In-vehicle sen-
sors
Infrastructure
sign
Prediction functions with the
Obstacles information from
the perception module, Local-
ization information from the
localization module, Planning
trajectory from the planning
module that are taken as raw
inputs from Machine vision,
Map, Acoustic sensors ad in-
vehicle sensors to perform its
function of anticipating future
motion trajectories.
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Continuation of Table A.3
Ground-
truth Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Planning Maps 0 4 8 9 14 16 19
28 29 31
In-vehicle sen-
sors, GPS,
LiDAR, Map,
Electronic
Devices,
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status), Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory),
In-vehicle sen-
sors(CANbus),
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status)
In-vehicle sen-
sors,
GPS,
LiDAR,
Electronic
Devices,
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
In-vehicle sen-
sors(CANbus)
In the manual recovery of ar-
chitecture, the analysis is that
planning contains the files re-
lated to maps only. However,
the function of planning is to
plan spatio-temporal trajec-
tories of the vehicle. Thus
the input sources for this
function involves the data col-
lected from in-vehicle sensors,
GPS, LiDAR, Electronic De-
vices, Odometric Sensors(Car
status), Road(Dreamview),
Infrastructure Sign(Planning
trajectory), In-vehicle sen-
sors(CANbus), Odometric
Sensors(Car status).
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Continuation of Table A.3
Ground-
truth Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Control Infrastructure
sign
Road
GPS
Electronic
Device
LiDAR
4 8 9 13 GPS,
LiDAR,
Electronic
Devices,
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
In-vehicle sen-
sors(CANbus)
Map
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
In-vehicle sen-
sors(CANbus)
Control executes the planned
spatio-temporal trajectory
by generating control com-
mands such as throttle, brake
and steering hence a control
flows to Odometer and Maps
through CANbus to other
devices and hardware.
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Continuation of Table A.3
Ground-
truth Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Common In-vehicle sen-
sors
Odometric
sensors
In-vehicle
devices
0 9 11 27 33 In-vehicle sen-
sors(CANbus),
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
–
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Continuation of Table A.3
Ground-
truth Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
CANbus In-vehicle sen-
sors
Odometric
sensors
In-vehicle
devices
0 9 11 27 33 In-vehicle sen-
sors(CanBus),
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
There is data flow from the
infrastructure sign to the
dreamview. Hence exposing
the two attack surfaces infras-
tructure sign and dreamview
in addition to the attack sur-
faces identified using manually
recovered architecture.
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Continuation of Table A.3
Ground-
truth Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Monitor GPS
In-vehicle sen-
sors
0 3 6 20 24 In-vehicle de-
vices
GPS
Road(HMI),
In-vehicle sen-
sors(CanBus)
In-vehicle de-
vices
Road(HMI)
Monitor is the surveillance sys-
tem for the entire vehicle in-
cluding the hardware. While
using the automated recovery
the Monitor component con-
sists the HMI(Human Machine
Interface) and In-vehicle de-
vices in addition to the manual
recovery attack surfaces.
Maps Maps – – – –
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Continuation of Table A.3
Ground-
truth Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Localization GPS
Electronic De-
vice
LiDAR
8 In-vehicle sen-
sors,
GPS,
LiDAR,
Electronic
Devices,
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
In-vehicle sen-
sors,
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
Localization leverages various
information sources such as
GPS and LiDAR to estimate
where the vehicle is located. If
the manual recovered architec-
ture is used for threat mod-
eling we find that the mod-
ule Localization takes in data
from GPS, Electronic Device
and LiDAR. However it sends
this data of estimating where
the vehicle is located to the
other modules.
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Continuation of Table A.3
Ground-
truth Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
v2x Infrastructure
sign Electronic
Device
Road
8 In-vehicle sen-
sors,
GPS,
LiDAR,
Electronic
Devices,
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
In-vehicle sen-
sors,
GPS,
LiDAR,
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status)
Vehicle-to-everything (V2X)
is a vehicular communication
system that incorporates
V2I(vehicle-to-infrastructure),
V2N(vehicle-to-network),
V2V(vehicle-to-vehicle),
V2D(vehicle-to-device) and
V2G(vehicle-to-grid). While
the manual recovery deduces
only some components, the
difference covers the rest of the
communication components
of vehicles.
End of Table
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Table A.4: Threat modeling with given architecture and re-
covered architecture
Begin of Table
Given Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Perception Machine vision
GPS
LiDAR
Electronic
device
Map
Acoustic sen-
sors
In-vehicle
sensors
0 2 7 18 26 30
32
LiDar
Machine vision
GPS
Electronic
device
Map
Acoustic sen-
sors
In-vehicle
sensors
None –
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Continuation of Table A.4
Given Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Prediction GPS
Electronic
Device
LiDAR
Infrastructure
sign
0 4 16 17 25 Machine vision
GPS
LiDAR
Electronic
device
Map
Acoustic sen-
sors
In-vehicle
sensors
Machine vision
Map
Acoustic sen-
sors
In-vehicle sen-
sors
Infrastructure
sign
The target surfaces identified
using recovered architecture
justifies using Obstacles in-
formation from the percep-
tion module, Localization in-
formation from the localiza-
tion module, Planning trajec-
tory of the previous comput-
ing cycle from the planning
module that are taken as raw
inputs from Machine vision,
Map, Acoustic sensors ad in-
vehicle sensors to perform its
function of anticipating future
motion trajectories.
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Continuation of Table A.4
Given Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Planning Maps 0 4 8 9 14 16 19
28 29 31
In-vehicle sen-
sors, GPS,
LiDAR, Map,
Electronic
Devices,
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status), Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory),
In-vehicle sen-
sors(CanBus),
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status)
In-vehicle sen-
sors,
GPS,
LiDAR,
Electronic
Devices,
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
In-vehicle sen-
sors(CanBus)
In the given architecture, the
planning module contains the
files related to maps only. The
function of planning however
is to plan spatio-temporal tra-
jectories of the vehicle. Thus
the input sources for this func-
tion involves the data col-
lected from In-vehicle sensors,
GPS, LiDAR,Electronic De-
vices, Odometric Sensors(Car
status), Road (Dreamview),
Infrastructure Sign(Planning
trajectory), In-vehicle sen-
sors(CanBus), Odometric Sen-
sors(Car status)
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Continuation of Table A.4
Given Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Control Infrastructure
sign
Road
GPS
Electronic
Device
LiDAR
4 8 9 13 GPS,
LiDAR,
Electronic
Devices,
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
In-vehicle sen-
sors(CanBus)
Map
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
In-vehicle sen-
sors(CanBus)
Control executes the planned
spatio-temporal trajectory
by generating control com-
mands such as throttle, brake
and steering hence a control
flows to Odometer and Maps
through CanBus to other
devices and hardware.
Guardian Acoustic Sen-
sors
no matching
clusters
– – –
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Continuation of Table A.4
Given Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
CANBus In-vehicle sen-
sors
Odometric
sensors
In-vehicle
devices
0 9 11 27 33 In-vehicle sen-
sors(CanBus),
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
Data flow from the infrastruc-
ture sign to the dreamview
through CANbus exposes
both infrastructure signs and
dreamview as attack surfaces.
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Continuation of Table A.4
Given Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Monitor GPS
In-vehicle sen-
sors
0 3 6 20 24 In-vehicle de-
vices
GPS
Road(HMI),
In-vehicle sen-
sors(CanBus)
In-vehicle de-
vices
Road(HMI)
Monitor is the surveillance sys-
tem for the entire vehicle in-
cluding the hardware. While
using the automated recovery
the Monitor component con-
sists the HMI and In-vehicle
devices in addition to the at-
tack surfaces identified using
given architecture.
HDMaps Maps – – – –
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Continuation of Table A.4
Given Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
Localization GPS
Electronic De-
vice
LiDAR
8 In-vehicle sen-
sors,
GPS,
LiDAR,
Electronic
Devices,
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
In-vehicle sen-
sors,
Odometric
Sensors(Car
status),
Road
(Dreamview),
Infrastructure
Sign(Planning
trajectory)
Localization leverages various
information sources such as
GPS, LiDAR and IMU to es-
timate where the vehicle is lo-
cated. If the automated recov-
ered is used for threat mod-
elling, we find that the mod-
ule Localization takes in data
from GPS, Electronic Device
and LiDAR. However it sends
this data of estimating where
the vehicle is located to the
other modules.
Relative
Map
Maps – – – –
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Continuation of Table A.4
Given Com-
ponents
Target Surface Clusters
matched
Target surfaces Difference in
attack surfaces
detected
Justification
HMI Electronic de-
vice
– – – –
Navigator Road – – – –
End of Table
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Listing A.1 Code for the automation of architecture recovery
from f u t u r e import p r i n t f u n c t i o n
import sys , copy
import s t r i n g
import re
Nodes =[ ] #Array f o r the data
IRNodes =[ ]
x = [ ” modules/common/math/ aabox2d tes t . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ adapters / a d a p t e r g f l a g s . txt ” ,
”modules/common/math/ a n g l e t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/common/math/ ang le . txt ” ,
”modules/ d r i v e r s /canbus/common/ b y t e t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/ d r i v e r s /canbus/common/ byte . txt ” ,
”modules/common/math/ c a r t e s i a n f r e n e t c o n v e r s i o n t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/ pe rcept i on /common/ p o i n t c l o u d p r o c e s s i n g /common test . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ adapters / p r e d i c t i o n g f l a g s . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ adapters / p r e d i c t i o n s y s t e m g f l a g s . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ c o n f i g s / c o n f i g g f l a g s . txt ” ,
”modules/ c o n t r o l /common/ c o n t r o l g f l a g s . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ f i l t e r s / d i g i t a l f i l t e r c o e f f i c i e n t s t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ f i l t e r s / d i g i t a l f i l t e r c o e f f i c i e n t s . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ f i l t e r s / d i g i t a l f i l t e r t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ f i l t e r s / d i g i t a l f i l t e r . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ u t i l / d i s j o i n t s e t t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ u t i l / f a c t o r y t e s t . txt ” ,
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”modules/ c o n t r o l /common/ h y s t e r e s i s f i l t e r t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/ c o n t r o l /common/ h y s t e r e s i s f i l t e r . txt ” ,
”modules/common/math/ i n t e g r a l t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/common/math/ i n t e g r a l . txt ” ,
”modules/ c o n t r o l /common/ i n t e r p o l a t i o n 2 d . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ u t i l / j s o n u t i l . tx t ” ,
”modules/common/kv db/ kv db te s t . txt ” ,
”modules/common/kv db/ kv db too l . txt ” ,
”modules/common/math/ l i n e s e g m e n t 2 d t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/ l o c a l i z a t i o n /common/ l o c a l i z a t i o n g f l a g s . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ u t i l / l r u c a c h e t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ f i l t e r s / m e a n f i l t e r t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ f i l t e r s / m e a n f i l t e r . txt ” ,
”modules/ pe rcept i on /common/ p e r c e p t i o n g f l a g s . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ u t i l / po int s downsample r t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/ monitor /common/ r e c u r r e n t r u n n e r t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/ monitor /common/ r e cu r r en t runne r . txt ” ,
”modules/common/math/ s e a r c h t e s t . txt ” ,
”modules/common/math/ search . txt ” ,
”modules/ d r i v e r s /canbus/ s e n s o r g f l a g s . txt ” ,
”modules/common/math/ s i n t a b l e . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ u t i l / s t r i n g t o k e n i z e r . txt ” ,
”modules/common/ time / t i m e r t e s t . txt ” ,
” cyber / time / t imer . txt ” ,
”modules/v2x/common/ v2x proxy g f l ag s . txt ” ,
”modules/common/math/ v e c 2 d t e s t . txt ” , ” s i n g l e . txt ” ,
”modules/ p r e d i c t i o n /common/ p r e d i c t i o n s y s t e m g f l a g s . txt ” ,
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”modules/ p r e d i c t i o n /common/ p r e d i c t i o n g f l a g s . txt ” ]
de f getData ( f i l ename , i ) :
f o l d e r =”/Users / s h i f a k /Downloads/ R e f i n e d C l u s t e r f i l e s ”
fp = open ( f o l d e r +’/’+ f i l ename )
l i n e = fp . r e a d l i n e ( )
record= l i n e . s t r i p ( ) . s p l i t ( ’ , ’ )
Nodes . append ( record )
fp . c l o s e ( )
#pars ing a l l the IR nodes
de f getDataIR1 ( f i l ename , i ) :
fp = open (”/ Users / s h i f a k /Downloads/ Ref ined IR/” + f i l ename )
l i n e = fp . r e a d l i n e ( )
record= l i n e . s t r i p ( ) . s p l i t ( ’ , ’ )
IRNodes . append ( record )
fp . c l o s e ( )
de f checkmatchnodes ( i ) :
p r i n t (” Executing matching func t i on : ”)
f o r n in range (0 , l en ( Nodes [ i ] ) ) :
y = Nodes [ i ] [ n ]
f o r j in range ( 0 , 4 7 ) :
f o r m in range (0 , l en ( IRNodes [ j ] ) ) :
i f ( y==IRNodes [ j ] [m] ) :
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p r in t (” Clus te r ” + s t r ( i )+ ” − ” + y + ” found in ” + x [ j ] )
p r i n t ( ’\n ’ )
break
e l s e : cont inue
de f main ( ) :
#pr in t (” s t a r t o f main func t i on ”)
getDataIR1 (” aabox2d tes t . txt ” ,0)
getDataIR1 (” a d a p t e r g f l a g s . txt ” ,1)
getDataIR1 (” a n g l e t e s t . txt ” ,2)
getDataIR1 (” ang le . txt ” ,3)
getDataIR1 (” b y t e t e s t . txt ” ,4)
getDataIR1 (” byte . txt ” ,5)
getDataIR1 (” c a r t e s i a n f r e n e t c o n v e r s i o n t e s t . txt ” ,6)
getDataIR1 (” common test . txt ” ,7)
getDataIR1 (”common−adapters−p r e d i c t i o n g f l a g s . txt ” ,8)
getDataIR1 (”common−adapters−p r e d i c t i o n s y s t e m g f l a g s . txt ” ,9)
getDataIR1 (” c o n f i g g f l a g s . txt ” ,10)
getDataIR1 (” c o n t r o l g f l a g s . txt ” ,11)
getDataIR1 (” d i g i t a l f i l t e r c o e f f i c i e n t s t e s t . txt ” ,12)
getDataIR1 (” d i g i t a l f i l t e r c o e f f i c i e n t s . txt ” ,13)
getDataIR1 (” d i g i t a l f i l t e r t e s t . txt ” ,14)
getDataIR1 (” d i g i t a l f i l t e r . txt ” ,15)
getDataIR1 (” d i s j o i n t s e t t e s t . txt ” ,16)
getDataIR1 (” f a c t o r y t e s t . txt ” ,17)
getDataIR1 (” h y s t e r e s i s f i l t e r t e s t . txt ” ,18 )
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getDataIR1 (” h y s t e r e s i s f i l t e r . txt ” ,19)
getDataIR1 (” i n t e g r a l t e s t . txt ” ,20)
getDataIR1 (” i n t e g r a l . txt ” ,21)
getDataIR1 (” i n t e r p o l a t i o n 2 d . txt ” ,22)
getDataIR1 (” j s o n u t i l . tx t ” ,23)
getDataIR1 (” kv db te s t . txt ” ,24)
getDataIR1 (” kv db too l . txt ” ,25)
getDataIR1 (” l i n e s e g m e n t 2 d t e s t . txt ” ,26)
getDataIR1 (” l o c a l i z a t i o n g f l a g s . txt ” ,27)
getDataIR1 (” l r u c a c h e t e s t . txt ” ,28)
getDataIR1 (” m e a n f i l t e r t e s t . txt ” ,29)
getDataIR1 (” m e a n f i l t e r . txt ” ,30)
getDataIR1 (” p e r c e p t i o n g f l a g s . txt ” ,31)
getDataIR1 (” po int s downsample r t e s t . txt ” ,32)
getDataIR1 (” r e c u r r e n t r u n n e r t e s t . txt ” ,33)
getDataIR1 (” r e cu r r en t runne r . txt ” ,34)
getDataIR1 (” s e a r c h t e s t . txt ” ,35)
getDataIR1 (” search . txt ” ,36)
getDataIR1 (” s e n s o r g f l a g s . txt ” ,37)
getDataIR1 (” s i n t a b l e . txt ” ,38)
getDataIR1 (” s t r i n g t o k e n i z e r . txt ” ,39)
getDataIR1 (” t i m e r t e s t . txt ” ,40)
getDataIR1 (” t imer . txt ” ,41)
getDataIR1 (” v2x proxy g f l ag s . txt ” ,42)
getDataIR1 (” v e c 2 d t e s t . txt ” ,43)
getDataIR1 (” s i n g l e . txt ” ,44)
getDataIR1 (” p r e d i c t i o n s y s t e m g f l a g s . txt ” ,45)
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getDataIR1 (” p r e d i c t i o n g f l a g s . txt ” ,46)
f o r x in range ( 0 , 4 2 ) :
p r i n t (” Clus te r ” + s t r ( x ) + ” compos it ion : ” )
getData (” outputCluster”+s t r ( x)+ ” . txt ” , x ) #f i l e name o f the c l u s t e r
checkmatchnodes ( x )
i f name == ’ main ’ :
main ( )
